S2E1 – Little Napoleons

Two decades before the Civil War, in May of 1840, a British writer and philosopher gave a series of six lectures in London that would shape an interpretive school of history that is still talked about today. The writer's name was Thomas Carlyle. He was born in Scotland, and we become a significant influencer of 19th century Victorian culture and thought, not just in Britain, but in the intellectual and literary West. His language, while romantic, as were the times, popularized history and did much to add it to the ranks of respected literature. In fact, his history of the French Revolution is still considered a classic. Carlyle's lectures, titled Collectively On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History, form the basis of a perspective that historians have called the Great Man Theory. That history can be best understood and explained by examining the heroic individuals whose talents and abilities had an effect upon and shaped the history itself. Our default presentism might wrestle with the very name Great Man Theory as being sexist. However, for a great majority living at the time, that thought may have never occurred to people. They would have had a wholly different context and subtext. Another way to approach and dig into Carlisle's theory and influence is by asking the great debate question, does the person make the history or does history make the person? Carlisle was staunchly in support of the idea that the person makes the history, especially heroic individuals. Opposing viewpoints to the great man theory are sometimes called history from below, or historical materialism. These theories gather the masses of populations or the produce of those masses together as the waves and currents of history that carry individuals and events along. The great man theory would see it as the other way around. Today, much of our culture likes to say it's progressed beyond such outdated ideas like the Great Man Theory, and that culture as a whole is where one needs to look for insight and inspiration. But I can't help but acknowledge the irony of the human need for heroes, and that it still endures. I think of writer Joseph Campbell and his work on heroes and comparative mythologies. And look at the biggest stories that are worldwide phenomena. Star Wars, Marvel, or DC superheroes, James Bond, Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings. They all speak to the heroic that attracts us and that we mirror. Look at the celebrity and entertainment reference points Americans in the world use today. They may not be great politicians or generals, but they are great musicians, athletes, personalities, and media stars. And they still fall into the great man theory of why they should matter to us, even if much of our culture would prefer to think of them as part of the masses of history from below. Either way, history and the hindsight it provides does demonstrate evidence from both perspectives. At the time of Thomas Carlyle, there was probably no leader, politically or militarily, or even as a type of celebrity, who had captured the minds of Europeans and Americans as a great man as effectively as Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon had risen from the masses as an obscure Corsican artillery officer, to become the Emperor of France at age thirty four. He went to war with all the powers of Europe and ruled a worldwide French Empire that was contesting global superiority with Britain. After just eleven years on the throne, he was gone, exiled to an island in the middle of the South Atlantic, where he would die at just fifty-one. If we were to travel back to 1793 and the siege of Toulon and witness the young Bonaparte's combat actions which earned him his first fame and recognition, none of us would have had any inkling that he would be one of Carlisle's great men of history. But that's not how it works. It only works as history looking back, and in that sense it's descriptive only. It is not prescriptive. It is unable to predict or determine who would become one of the great heroic individuals on the world stage. Napoleon had, in fact, been wounded in the leg at the siege of Toulon. And had the bayonet, the one that had wounded him, stabbed him from a slightly different angle or with a little more thrust behind it, it could have been mortal. And then would someone else have risen through the ranks of the French military and caught the eyes of influencers, someone who would have become a completely different emperor of France, or perhaps no emperor at all. That's where the infinite combination of choices and actions instantly obliterates many of the great what if games we like to play with history. But back to Napoleon and his significance upon the rest of the nineteenth century. Let's consider some of the ways his shadow gets cast across everything we've been experiencing so far that leads into the American Civil War. First, there are the geopolitical effects he left behind. The eighteen sixties existed in light of Napoleon's legacy, not only through the exploits of his wars and conquests in Europe, but also through the fear of how he handled the slave revolt on the French colony of Saint Domingue that ended in 1803. Napoleon had sent his brother-in-law and 30,000 troops to uphold the law. But yellow fever and rampant violence would decimate the French and lead to Haitian independence. Over the next 50 years, the stories of the slaughter of tens of thousands of French colonists by armed slaves certainly replayed over and over in the minds of the white citizens of the Cotton South. As we saw in the episode American Slavery, Nat Turner's Rebellion in Virginia in 1831 made the possibility of another San Domingue all too real for many Americans. And then there was the territorial deal that doubled the size of the U.S. at the same time. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803, whereby President Thomas Jefferson bought a massive spread of the land west of the Mississippi from Napoleon for $15 per square mile, left a Napoleonic thumbprint on the policies necessary to manage whether or not there would be an expansion of slavery into new states. We could wonder if there had been no Louisiana purchase, might there have been no civil war? Again, an interesting thought exercise, but too many contributing factors and people involved to make it cut and dried. Then there's the military theory Napoleon bequeathed to future generations of commanders that invited study and scrutiny by politicians and others in America, both North and South. Napoleon's Maxims of War, a collection of principles assembled by a French officer in 1827, was translated into English in 1831 and reprinted in the U.S. The Emperor became the central point of reference for military effectiveness. For example, on july eighth, eighteen sixty one, Confederate General Beauregard would write Texas Senator Louis Wigfall, quote, Oh that I had the genius of a Napoleon to be more worthy of our cause and of confidence. The following month, one of Stonewall Jackson's officers was sharing his ideas about maneuvering Confederate troops. Jackson responded with Mystery, mystery, major is the secret of success. Napoleon marched his men fifty miles in 24 hours and fought and won pitched battles, and ours can do the same. End quote. Napoleon was effectively the great man that shadowed overall and was the foundation of all things military in the mid-19th century. This concept of the great man theory is an appropriate way to begin season two of this podcast. Because from here on out, across the next four years of Civil War, we're going to meet dozens and dozens, if not hundreds, of individuals who, at our time of meeting, could potentially have the qualities, the characteristics, the X factor necessary to be labeled as one of Thomas Carlyle's great men. According to Carlyle, individuals are born with innate skills and qualities that predispose them to leadership, things like courage, intellect, decisiveness, charisma, and the ability to think strategically. These people then shape history by their influence and actions and step onto the world stage when society needs them to do so. And throughout season one, we've undoubtedly already spoken about many men in American history that we might say would fit Carlisle's description. For example, Andrew Jackson pretty much shut down the threat of secession in the 1830s by taking a courageous and decisive stand to preserve the Union. Henry Clay used his charisma and intellect to strategically lead Congress through the ups and downs of 30 years of politics. And General Winfield Scott wasn't called the grand old man of the army for no reason. Yet all three also demonstrated questionable qualities and suffered from negativity. Jackson's unapologetic hatred of blacks and Native Americans and his political agenda of Indian removal stained his legacy. Clay's ownership of slaves and his recognized gambling habits were not very heroic. And Scott's ego and pursuit of glory while nationally being rejected for president, like Clay, would never earn him a spot on Mount Rushmore. But let's also remember that opportunity doesn't equate with heroism. At the time they stepped on the stage, no one had any idea that presidents Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, or James Buchanan would not be remembered as great men who led the country, or that Stephen A. Douglas and John J. Crittenden would not be top-tier great men who would lead the Congress, or that nearly all the generals who would initially lead the armies of the North and the South would not be the great men that would win the war. That's both the wonder and cold hard reality of John Gardner's powerful quote that has been the starting point of this podcast, namely that history never looks like history when you're living through it. Likewise, generals and the decisions they make may not present themselves as triumphs or tragedies at the moment that they're happening. That's because of the messiness of history. Whether we call the viewpoint opposing the great man theory history from below or historical materialism, there were strong arguments from those who were contemporaries of Carlisle. Like Englishman Herbert Spencer and the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy, who both described any supposed great man as a slave to history and a product of his society, throw in equal measures of the unpredictability and fickleness bound up in the heart of every person, and then multiply that exponentially across every single person that crosses the path of another, and now suddenly it's a miracle that anyone can accomplish anything that remotely even seems great, and yet those things still do happen. We shall see. Welcome to Breaking Nation, a Civil War podcast. I'm your host, Scott Holmgren. My goal is simple to bring the American Civil War to life by exploring and discovering the people, the places, and the events of this critical era as if we didn't know how it would turn out. When the sun rose on april fourteenth, eighteen sixty one, the flag of the United States was lowered from above the smoking remains of the fort. Major Robert Anderson, who had surrendered the installation to the Confederate States of America, would lead his weary command away from Charleston Harbor, and Americans would watch and wonder What had just happened? Was this an isolated incident? Was this a symbolic gesture of resolve? Was this the beginning of a war? Was this the new normal? What did it all mean for Americans? That morning the front page of the New York Herald proclaimed in headline The surrender of Fort Sumter, the bombardment ceased, the fort evacuated, all the federal officers unhurt, blockade of the port of Charleston, effect of the war news in the North and South. What I find most interesting from that headline is the use of the word war. In both Boston and Charleston, the word war was repeated. In the North, papers also used words like rebellion, insurrection, and crisis. In the South, journalists called it the start of hostilities, conflict, revolution, and war of independence. If it technically was not war, it was understood as war across the social subtext. Turning the page New Yorkers would read The last blow has been given to the fabric of freedom, raised at such cost by the fathers of the Republic. The time for argument has ceased, and the appeal that has been made to arms precludes the possibility of foretelling what may be the issue of the present melancholy crisis. Virginia is on the eve of secession. Her example will be followed by other border states. That same morning, President Abraham Lincoln met with his cabinet in the Executive Mansion. Since April 1st, he had requested from the commander of the Army, General Winfield Scott, daily reports on what was being done to anticipate the prospects of war, should fighting break out. These handwritten notes outlined the location and movement of companies and garrisons of federal troops across the breadth of the country, from the arsenal at Fayetteville, North Carolina to the Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis. On april fifth, Lincoln received a full accounting of the entire army of the United States, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Seventeen thousand one hundred and thirteen total officers and men. Seventeen thousand. That was it. Seventeen thousand to defend the entire country. That's about the seating capacity of the basketball arena that the Phoenix Suns play in. That's what Lincoln would have available at his command should he decide to act with military force. That army would have to deal with eventually seven hundred and fifty thousand square miles of seceded Confederate territory. Those numbers tell us something. That the Army was a peacetime force, tasked mainly with patrolling the Western frontier and key installations like Fort Sumter. It was not prepared for what was now happening in April of eighteen sixty one. So with the surrender of Fort Sumter, what would the president do? Lincoln's predecessor, James Buchanan, had famously done nothing, as seven states, starting with South Carolina, had left the Union while he was still in office. Lincoln could not now do nothing. His election had been the country's referendum on the Laissez faire responses of Buchanan and the Northern Doefaces. What were Lincoln's options? Americans, both North and South, free and enslaved, held their breath on april fourteenth and recalled the president's words from his inaugural address some six weeks before, when he had said, I therefore consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the states. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you, you can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. And now the Confederacy had attacked and forced the surrender of Federal Fort Sumter. And Americans were divided on what Lincoln would do next. Some believe Lincoln did not have the spine to stand up to the bold words of his inauguration. It was unimaginable that Americans would actually fire upon Americans, noting that even at Fort Sumter, the hand of God had prevented any deaths during the battle itself. Was not the cannonade in Charleston Harbor enough to demonstrate that the Confederacy was serious about its claims and legitimate in its stand? Lincoln would do well to acknowledge the seceded states could do as they pleased. He could decide to let the South go its own way and remove all federal troops from the Confederacy. Others believed Lincoln would press forward with his insistence that secession was illegal, but that before full scale fighting could break out, the president should make one final last ditch effort to negotiate a compromise. Remember, the Great Peace Conference in February and the recently passed Corwin Amendment had shown that Americans did value peace. Lincoln had also said in his inaugural, quote, My countrymen think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. Many recalled that it was Lincoln's well reasoned perspective on the crisis that was his greatest strength, and that surely the need to reason together, think calmly, and take some time would avoid the bloodshed of war. Then there were others who insisted upon action. Something had to be done. The honor of the Union had been insulted, a federal fort had been attacked, and that force demanded force. But how strong should the reply be? Some saw a naval blockade of the southern ports as an appropriate response, enough action to show that Lincoln would respond to aggression. Let's put pressure on the seceded states economically and socially. We can show them the error and foolishness of their ways. No more southern cotton would go to Europe and no more supplies would be imported by the South. But for many, that wasn't enough. These Southern rebels had made their true intentions and objectives known and had fired first. This was an insurrection, plain and simple. Lincoln needed to call for troops to restore order and ensure that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the states. As the president met with his cabinet and his military advisors, Lincoln weighed these options against the many possible outcomes. What would he do? Which course would he choose? Contributing to the need to respond, he also faced four distinct challenges that were set squarely before him. First, there was the political pressure he faced across the North from many who wanted peace at all costs, both Republicans and Democrats. Second, there were the states of the Upper South, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and most importantly, Virginia, that Lincoln needed to keep in the Union along with the border states just north of them. Third, the president would establish and define the purpose of whichever decision he'd make that would be. That would set a precedent for future decisions. And fourth and finally, what would Lincoln do about his understrength army and those officers he'd need to lead it? While Lincoln considered his response, General Scott had been dealing with the day to day reality of too few troops in and around the Capitol by scrambling for whatever security forces he could get his hands on, telling the president, I have no policemen at my service, and no fund for the payment of detectives, but under the circumstances recommend that such agents should be at once employed in Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Richmond, and Norfolk. For the reasons stated, I am not prepared to suggest that a militia force should be called out to defend this capital, under Section two of the Militia Act of 1795. The necessity of such call, however, may not be very distant. What Scott was referring to was an act passed by Congress sixty five years prior, to put down a revolt in western Pennsylvania known as the Whiskey Rebellion. It empowered then President George Washington to call out state militia in times of imminent invasion or insurrection. When the War of 1812 broke out with Britain, the militia were called into service and were then immediately formed into volunteer units under federal command. This was repeated when war was declared on Mexico. And so now, with armed violence aimed at Federal forces at Fort Sumter and the reality of an insurrection spreading northward from the deep south to the upper south, the Militia Act was squarely on the table. General Scott was taking measures to be prepared for the worst. In the days immediately leading up to Fort Sumter, and then during the bombardment itself, Lincoln had been developing and forming his opinions, while telegrams were bringing the news from Charleston. The president wrote on the thirteenth saying, If, as now appears to be true, an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the government was devolved upon me, and in every event I shall, to the extent of my ability, repel force by force. There, as the bombardment took place, Lincoln's next step coalesced around what he saw as his duty to the country and government. An armed insurrection had used force to take a federal post, and now force would be used to meet it. As Lincoln and his cabinet met, they crafted a proclamation that would be in response to Jefferson Davis' order four days earlier to reduce Fort Sumter, in other words, to blast it into rubble. The next day on april fifteenth, eighteen sixty one, the President of the United States issued, quote, a proclamation, whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and are now opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. Combinations That was the legal term chosen to label what was happening, without recognizing Davis and the Confederate States as a separate nation. Combinations, it was a term used for movements made up of members working together by their own gains, and that's how Lincoln addressed the South. In so doing, he stayed the course against recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation, just as he had done when the Southern Commissioners tried their best to meet with him and Secretary of State Seward the month before. The proclamation continued Therefore I hereby do call forth the militia of the several states of the Union to the aggregate number of seventy five thousand in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed, and I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date. With a stroke of his pen, Lincoln more than quadrupled the size of the Union Army, but was it an army for war? Technically and legally, here we get a glimpse into Lincoln's seeing his reasoning through. Only Congress could declare war, and war was an action taken against a foreign nation. But the Southerners were not a foreign nation, but a combination, so no war would occur. The Militia Act was to suppress insurrections, and this was an insurrection started by powerful combinations. However, the president still needed Congress to authorize spending for the new army, but Congress was not in session. So Lincoln added a call for senators and representatives to convene for a special session on the fourth of July, as patriotic a day as could be. How could the government not sanction Lincoln's actions when the Star Spangled Banner had been fired on? The april fifteenth proclamation galvanized the Union. Lincoln's private secretaries Nicolay and Hay described the response across the country. The lion of the North was fully roused, war sermons from pulpits, war speeches in every assemblage, tenders of troops, offers of money, military proclamations and orders in every newspaper, every city radiant with bunting, every village green a mustering ground, war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council, war preparations in every public or private workshop, gun castings in the great foundries, cartridge making in the principal towns, camps and drills in the fields, parades, drums, flags and bayonets in the streets, knitting, bandage rolling, and lint scraping in nearly every household. The Daily National Intelligencer in Washington wrote on the fifteenth Our people now one and all are determined to sustain the government and demand a vigorous prosecution of the war inaugurated by the disunionists. All sympathy with them is dead. In the South it was the same response, but for a very different cause. Confederate War Secretary Walker had initially called for 21,000 volunteers to defend the South, but with Lincoln's proclamation and call for 75,000 militia, he notified the seven Confederate governors that 32,000 more would be needed to take the field. In addition, if there was any thought that the Upper South would remain in the Union, it was immediately dashed by Lincoln's call for troops. Never, no, never would Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, or Virginia raise militia that would be sent against their fellow Southerners. Each state flatly refused to respond to Lincoln's proclamation. And then on april seventeenth, Virginia took the next step. Responding to Lincoln's call for militia, Governor John Letcher replied to War Secretary Cameron, saying, quote, The militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object, an object in my judgment not within the purview of the Constitution or the Act of seventeen ninety five will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and having done so we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the administration has exhibited toward the South. The Virginia Secession Convention had originally convened back in February and had been watching and waiting to see what would happen. That day the Virginians voted eighty eight to fifty five to secede from the Union. By may sixth and seventh, both Arkansas and Tennessee would join the Confederacy, and on may twentieth, North Carolina would become the eleventh and final state to fully secede and exit the Union. North Carolina attorney Jonathan Worth, a Union man himself, would write sullen words on may thirteenth that must have represented many reluctant secessionists when he said Lincoln prostrated us. He could have devised no scheme more effectual than the one he has pursued to overthrow the friends of the Union here. Whatever may be his purpose, any sensible man could foresee, and this act of his will prove that he is the most efficient auxiliary of the secessionists. I have been the most persevering and determined public man of my state to preserve the Union, the last to abandon the hope that the good sense of the nation would prevent a collision between the extremes, each of which I viewed with equal abhorrence. I am left no other alternative but to fight for or against my section. I cannot hesitate. Lincoln has made us a unit to resist until we repel our invaders or die. As Virginia led the way as the highest profile state to secede after Fort Sumter, the Daily Picyoon in New Orleans enthusiastically reported on april nineteenth quote We never saw our population so much excited as it was yesterday afternoon, when the glorious news spread all over town as wildfire that Virginia, the mother of presidents, had seceded at last. Citizens on the sidewalks were shaking each other by the hand, our office was overcrowded, the boys were running to and fro, unable to restrain their delight, and now and then venting their enthusiasm by giving a hearty hurrah. The final two weeks of april eighteen sixty one gave each president a brief window to lean into the surging tide of populist support each had following Fort Sumter. Lincoln's proclamation of the fifteenth set a ticking clock in motion. He had given the persons composing the combinations twenty days to disperse. That set the first week of May as the next deadline for Washington and Montgomery to circle on their respective governmental calendars. Not sure anyone believed that in twenty days the Confederacy would call it quits and walk back into the Union. Just the opposite. As newspapers broadcast their patriotic cries of rhetoric, and politicians bolstered their energetic and eager constituents' steps toward action, two immediate opportunities presented themselves, simultaneously, to both Lincoln and Davis. The first had to do with seagoing commerce. We've seen previously how the North outmanufactured the South, how the statistic was used to justify a road to secession, and how the Confederacy would need to figure out how to get the goods it needed. Besides having to maintain trade and commerce with Europe, there was also a coastline of shipping routes used all along the northern seaboard, routes used by northern vessels. This fact led Jefferson Davis to make a proclamation of his own on April 17th. Davis invited individuals of the Confederacy to apply for letters of mark and reprisal. This was fancy language for governmental licensing during the age of sailing ships. A person receiving the letters would become a privateer, and would have authority to attack and seize northern shipping on the high seas. With no navy of its own at the start of hostilities, the Confederacy had to do all it could to effect the capture of weapons and supplies. Throughout the war, about fifty privateers were issued commissions, though many had minimal effect on U.S. commerce. But the threat of immediate naval attacks was something Lincoln could not ignore. So, two days later, Lincoln seized the same opportunity and he issued his own counter proclamation. This was to blockade the ports of the South and deal with Confederate privateers via the laws of piracy. This was the first of many decisions that Lincoln would weigh against the varying legal perspectives of his cabinet. Secretary of State Seward argued for the blockade. Navy Secretary Gideon Wells didn't like how a blockade might invite Europe to see this as a war between belligerent powers and lead them to recognizing the Confederacy as legitimate. The cabinet was evenly divided, but Lincoln leaned Seward's way and ordered the blockade, and Wells would be the one to administer and enforce it. The second opportunity for the presidents had to do with who would be the commanders of the new armies that would be gathering to repel force by force. Lincoln already had a general of the army in Winfield Scott. He was heroic, brilliant, argumentative, and full of himself. Standing six five and two hundred and thirty pounds in his prime, he fought in the War of 1812, becoming a brigadier general. He studied warfare in Europe and wrote the three volume drill manual that the U.S. Army used until 1855. He won the war with Mexico in 1847, prompting the British Duke of Wellington, the guy who fought Napoleon at Waterloo, to call Scott, quote, the greatest living general unsurpassed in military annals, end quote. He was general in chief under seven presidents. When Lincoln was sworn into the White House, Scott basically came with the furniture. As a military man, he was an American warrior. Edwin Stanton wrote former President Buchanan on may sixteenth, eighteen sixty one, saying, quote, General Scott seems to have carte blanche. He is, in fact, the government, and if his health continues, vigorous measures are anticipated. End quote. However, by eighteen sixty one, the seventy five-year-old commander was often in ill health and far from able to take command in the field. He was obese, weighing over 300 pounds, and suffered from dropsy, gout, and vertigo. He could only walk a few steps without stopping and could not mount, let alone ride a horse. His mind was still sharp, but even he knew that someone else would need to take an active role in leading the new Union Army on campaign. Besides Scott, the only other general remaining in the U.S. Army who had commanded a force large enough to be considered an army was John Wool, who was two years older than Scott. While not debilitated like Scott, Wool, at seventy seven, was still an image of the Army of the past, not of the Army of the present. After Scott and Wool, Brigadier Generals William Harney and Joseph Johnston were the most senior. But Harney was half a continent away and commanded the Department of the West in St. Louis, and Johnston was then the quartermaster general of the Army, a post he'd held for just ten months. The soldier that Scott held in highest regard had been someone that he had named previously as the one he'd prefer to fight a great battle and even succeed him as head of the army. That soldier, as we've already seen, had just been summoned from Texas to return east to Washington. Robert E. Lee. The Virginia native graduated second in his class at West Point and would later serve as superintendent of the Academy. He served with great distinction in the war with Mexico and also commanded the detachment that had captured John Brown at Harper's Ferry in 1859. And he had just been made colonel of the first U.S. Cavalry. President Lincoln was well aware of Scott's affinity for the 54-year-old Lee. The older general had said that his success in Mexico was due to the skill, valor, and courage of Lee, who was, quote, the greatest soldier now living, and if he ever gets the opportunity, he will prove himself the greatest captain in history. End quote. With Scott's endorsement of Lee fixed in his mind, Lincoln asked his close friend, advisor, and newspaper publisher, Francis P. Blair, to do him a favor. The president wanted to know if Lee would accept command of the new Union Army that would assemble in the field, and he wanted Blair to ask him. On April eighteenth, Lee met with Blair. Just three months earlier, while in Texas, Lee had written to his cousin Martha about his despair over states seceding from the Union. Lee had said, quote, If a disruption takes place, I shall go back in sorrow to my people and share the misery of my native state, and save in her defense there will be one soldier less in the world than now. I wish for no other flag than the Star Spangled Banner, and no other heir, or song, than Hail Columbia. I still hope the wisdom and patriotism of the nation will yet save it. But now here he sat, across from Blair, and was given the chance to not just fight under that star spangled banner, but to lead the army that would carry it at its head. Would he accept the honor and opportunity that Scott described to prove himself the greatest captain in history? Years later Lee recalled the meeting to a friend saying, quote, I never intimated to anyone that I desired the command of the United States Army. I declined the offer he made to me to take command of the army that was to be brought into the field, stating as candidly and as courteously as I could, that though opposed to secession and depreciating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States. Leaving Blair, Lee did go to meet with his chief, where General Scott must have encouraged him to reconsider. As a fellow Virginian, Scott was a Unionist through and through and must have impressed upon Lee his duty as a soldier. That night, and the following day, Lee deliberated at his home in Arlington, just across the Potomac River from the Capitol. He most likely received news of developments across Virginia and Maryland, pointing to activities taken by secessionists as well as Lincoln's order to blockade southern ports. On april twentieth, Lee wrote to General Scott, having made his decision. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. Save in defense of my native state, I never desire again to draw my sword. With Lee's resignation, the president and his general would have to look elsewhere to find someone to be their great man, their Napoleon. At the same time, Jefferson Davis surveyed his leaders and advisors for someone who would bring form and function to the new Confederate Army. Samuel Cooper was a 63-year-old native New Yorker who graduated from West Point in 1815 and took a wife from a prominent Virginia family. A career in the Army spanned the Second Seminole War, the War with Mexico, appointment as Adjutant General of the Army, and led to a friendship with Jefferson Davis. For those unfamiliar with the term, the Adjutant General was the chief administrative officer of the Army. As Southern states seceded, Cooper in turn resigned from the U.S. Army on March 7th. Having adopted his wife's family's loyalties as Virginians, and having acquired slaves of his own, Cooper made his way to the Confederate Capitol in Montgomery and offered his services to the new president. Davis and War Secretary Walker appointed him a brigadier general with the posts of Adjutant General and Inspector of General of the new Confederate Army. With this one organizational piece in place, Davis suddenly had experience and know-how to build on. Interestingly, Samuel Cooper would be the highest ranking general in the Confederacy throughout the war, reporting directly to Davis due to his earliest date of rank, though he'd never lead troops in the field. As we've seen, when the events in Charleston led to Fort Sumter, Davis turned to Pierre Gustave Dutamp Beauregard to take command of the forces assembling there. His seizure of the fort gave the South its first bona fide hero, a winning general and perhaps a Napoleon in the making. It would remain to be seen how the rest of the Confederacy's army would come together. State governors had begun to appoint commanders to lead their own state militias. Virginia's Governor Lecture offered Robert E. Lee command of the state's army, which Lee accepted a few days after turning down Lincoln's offer. But soon thereafter the individual state militias aggregated into the new National Army, and then following Cooper, four more officers would be named full generals of the Confederacy, Albert Sidney Johnston, Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, no relation to the other, and Beauregard. Would these be the great men who would lead the Confederacy into the future? The exodus of officers from the U.S. Army was a significant development in the unfolding of hostilities. Similar to politicians and judges resigning their federal posts to enlist in the Confederacy, a great majority of the experienced military leaders who left the Union would join the Southern Army as it formed across the South. Different sources give different numbers, but there were about 300 officers who would resign or be dismissed from the U.S. Army. Like Cooper, Lee, Beauregard, and the two Johnstons, about 270 of these, in total, would join the Confederacy in 1861 and 1862. Meanwhile, Lincoln and his cabinet felt this personnel shift in the ground under their feet. While Seward wondered what they were to do for generals, War Secretary Cameron expressed his desperation saying, quote, I found the nation without an army, and I found scarcely a man throughout the War Department in whom I could put my trust. End quote. Lincoln and Scott had to move on after Lee's refusal to take command. The next man up for Scott would need to be someone he could trust, someone from his inner circle that he thought highly of. But who would that be? High ranking Joseph Johnston had left his position of quartermaster general when Virginia seceded. Albert Sidney Johnston resigned command in California to join the Confederacy. As officers left, Scott had fewer choices to turn to. General William Harney was in charge in St. Louis, which left Robert Patterson as the next available officer to call upon near Washington. Patterson was 69 and had been Scott's second in command in Mexico, seeing combat and getting wounded at the Battle of Saragordo. A Pennsylvanian Patterson was given command of that state's volunteers and then placed in charge of all the forces assembling in the area around the Capitol, from Southeast Pennsylvania through Maryland to Delaware in the District of Columbia. As the oldest major general in the army at the time, could he be dependent on to lead Mr. Lincoln's army in the field? Would Robert Patterson possess the qualities of a Napoleon and become the great man of the North? Day by day as the month of April wore on, war excitement and enthusiasm swept both the Union and the Confederacy. On the eighteenth, the day Lee met with Blair, the front page of the Chicago Tribune proclaimed Chicago Volunteers, last night the city was alive with volunteer meetings. The coolest resolution coupled with the most stirring enthusiasm marked all the gatherings. Between fifteen and sixteen hundred men are already on the muster rolls. The work must go on. Though Illinois has been drawn on for only six regiments, it is inevitable that the call will soon be doubled or trebled. There is no time for delay. Two days before the Memphis Daily Appeal notified its citizens, quote, resolved that a committee to be composed of the Colonel of the Hundred Fifty Fourth Regiment of Tennessee Volunteers and each of the captains of the various companies be appointed to prepare an address to the citizens of Memphis, soliciting voluntary contributions for the purpose of equipping our military for service, to place the regiment upon a war footing. This policy of Lincoln we are determined to resist at all hazards to the last extremity. In every city, town, county, and village, men rallied to the call to war. Armories were opened, rifles distributed, ammunition passed along as volunteer regiments aggregated and assembled across the North and South. On the eighteenth, New York lawyer and diarist George Templeton Strong witnessed the sixth Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment march through the city, bound for Washington. He wrote, quote, immense crowd, immense cheering, my eyes filled with tears, and I was half choked in sympathy with the contagious excitement. God be praised for the unity of feeling here, end quote. But it would take time for the gathering regiments to get organized, equipped, and then centralized in camps to form armies for battle. In the meantime, Washington, DC was surrounded by rebellious insurrectionists. Virginia across the Potomac River had seceded, and Maryland, which sealed off the capital against the river, was a slaveholding state. If Maryland left the Union, the seat of government of the United States would be an island within the Confederate States. And things were getting worse. The day after Virginia seceded, Federal troops set fire to the armory at Harper's Ferry, knowing they could not defend it before leaving for Pennsylvania. Famous for John Brown's raid there in 1859, the post was seized by Virginia troops on April 19th. Then the very next day, the U.S. Navy abandoned its key base in Virginia, the Gossport Navy Yard, off Hampton Roads. As nearly 3,000 Virginia militiamen gathered in nearby Portsmouth and Norfolk, the Federal commander, seeing no way to hold it, ordered the base destroyed, and U.S. ships to either flee or be scuttled. When Southern troops occupied the yard, they found the machinery and dry dock intact, and they captured more than a thousand undamaged heavy cannon, which in time would be sent to various locations all across the South. But another prize was the forty gun steam frigate USS Merrimack, that some considered one of the most powerful warships in the world at the time. While sunk by U.S. demolition teams, the Merrimack suffered relatively light damage from fire, and most of its engineering was intact, and sunken ships could be raised to sail again another day. These blows, day after day after day, beat down upon Lincoln and General Scott. Federal bases were being lost, and Confederates were seizing valuable military assets. The president and his general were facing a precarious situation. And where were the seventy five thousand volunteers Lincoln had called for? The city was essentially defenseless. Let's pause and get inside of the heads of the locals there in and around the District of Columbia. For everyone who lived their entire lives around Washington, DC, especially those who were in their 60s or older in 1861, there were vivid memories of what had happened 47 years before in 1814. That was when 4,000 British troops marched through Maryland and advanced on Washington City to exact some retribution for American actions during the War of 1812. The British would face about a thousand reliable U.S. regulars and Marines and several thousand less dependable local militia. After rolling over several temporary lines of American defense, the British then marched right into the Capitol on August 24, 1814, as the government fled. When President James Madison returned, a week later, the Capitol Building, the White House, the Treasury and War Buildings, and the Washington Navy Yard had all been burned and destroyed. Imagine the fear of a repeat of that nightmare in the hearts of that older generation, their children having heard the stories across the years. Imagine the humiliation of those to whom the defense of the capital had been entrusted. Imagine Winfield Scott, who at the time had been fighting the British along the Great Lakes, remembering the helplessness and anger he'd felt when he heard that Washington had been destroyed. And now in 1861 he could see how it could happen all over again if something wasn't done. The danger was real. It had happened before. On April 18th, five companies of Pennsylvania troops finally arrived in Washington. It was a start. While Scott had minimal forces in the Capitol, surprisingly, it was a pair of politicians who stepped up to do what they could do to maintain security and keep the peace. Cassius Marcellus Clay, who was a cousin to the famous Henry Clay, was a Kentucky politician and a tough character. He had fought in Mexico, survived two assassination attempts, and was an early member of the Republican Party. After his inauguration, Lincoln chose Cassius Clay to be his ambassador to Russia. But before he could leave, Fort Sumter fell, and he found himself delayed in Washington. Looking for a way to support the president and secure the Capitol, Clay set about recruiting and outfitting 300 volunteers and locals into a unit he called the Washington Guards. Likewise, James Lane was the new senator from the new state of Kansas, which had gained statehood in January. Lane saw how defenseless Washington was as well. He rounded up more than a hundred fellow Kansans that he could find in the city and formed his Kansas frontier guards. Lincoln was grateful for the security they provided, and Lane's men were quartered in the east room of the White House. Not only did they keep the Capitol safe, but they provided added protection against suspicions and fears of the murder or kidnapping of the president on the grounds of his home. Clay's Washington guards and Lane's frontier guards brought some reassurance to the president. But the reinforcements gathering all across the North were the security that the entire government waited for. Yet there was no getting around it. The Northern soldiers heading to D.C. would have to travel through Maryland and run a gauntlet of Southern sympathizers in order to reach Washington. As regiments funneled south from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, they'd have to march and take trains through New York City and Philadelphia, eventually passing through the city of Baltimore. Baltimore was the fourth largest city in the country, with over 210,000 citizens, nearly four times the size of Washington to its south. And Maryland was torn between its Confederate and Unionist sentiments. Nicolayan Hay only slightly exaggerate when they write, quote, in no state were the secession plottings more determined and continuous than in Maryland. From the first, a small but able and unwearying knot of Baltimore conspirators sought to commit her people to rebellion by the empty form of a secession ordinance. They made speeches, held conventions, besieged the governor with committees, they sent recruits to Charleston, and there is no doubt that in those doings they reflected a strong minority sentiment in the state. End quote. The state and city were suspected of harboring agitators. If you remember, in February, when Lincoln traveled to Washington for his inauguration, the very real threat of an assassination in Baltimore forced the president-elect to change his plans. Now, two months later, would the city, and let's remember Baltimore is located north of the Capitol, would it continue to be a thorn in the president's side? On April 19th, the sixth Massachusetts Volunteers, the unit George Templeton Strong wrote about seeing March through New York in his diary, rode via train into Baltimore after departing Boston and traveling through New York and Philadelphia. When they arrived at the President Street Station, they faced the very same challenge Lincoln had two months before, when he arrived in Baltimore at the Calvert Street Station to the north. They had to disembark and then march ten city blocks west past the Inner Harbor to the Camden Station. En route to Baltimore, the regiment's colonel Edward F. Jones got wind of the possibility of opposition from Southern sympathizers to his men's progress through the city. His report, written later, included his message to his regiment as he strode through the train carriages. He told them, quote, The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever. But march with your faces square to the front and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles. But if you are fired upon and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you and be sure you drop him. Imagine being a young Massachusetts militiaman. Just a few days before you were celebrated and cheered as you marched with friends and neighbors through Boston and New York. Riding toward the nation's capital, you're answering the call of your president. With glory and heroism, you're dedicated to the cause of putting down an armed enemy on a field of battle. And now you're just told that you'll be marching down a hostile city street surrounded by who knows what? Or imagine you're a resident of Baltimore, and all of a sudden armed soldiers from another state have come to your home to possibly hurt or kill friends or relatives of yours across the Potomac in Virginia. They come with rifles and steel bayonets to oppress people who just want to be left alone to live their lives. Either way, as several train cars were detached and pulled by horses westward along Pratt Street, a flowing mob of citizens impeded progress. Four companies, about 240 soldiers, formed ranks in the street and were determined to complete the journey on foot. At that point, Colonel Jones' warning became reality. He would remember his Massachusetts boys, quote, they were furiously attacked by a shower of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their steps to double quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no ammunition, and pistol shots were numerously fired into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order fire was given and it was executed. In consequence, several of the mob fell. As clouds of smoke and debris swirled through the street, the mayor of Baltimore moved alongside a Massachusetts captain, begging him to have the soldiers hold their fire. They pressed forward until they reached the station where city police broke the tide of the mob. Chaos swirled through the avenues with screams of anger and terror. Behind them the regiment left bundles, sacks, and rolls of equipment strewn in the streets. Five soldiers were killed and thirty six wounded. A dozen civilians were killed and perhaps more than a hundred wounded. The city's law enforcement was placed on full emergency duty and guards were posted at public buildings and key intersections. The following day, the Baltimore Sun would report the news Citizens of Baltimore shot down in our streets, Massachusetts volunteers killed and wounded, calling out of city military. The railroads declined to pass any more Northern troops. Along with the shock and sadness of the violence in Baltimore, that last fact rattled Lincoln and Scott as they faced being cut off from the North. If Baltimore closed its rail lines, Washington would not see the arrival of any more troops. All eyes turned toward Maryland's governor, Thomas Hicks. What would the state governor say? A former Whig and Know Nothing, Hicks faced pressure from the mayor and leaders of Baltimore, who demanded that he authorize the destruction of railroad bridges leading into the city. They did not want any more federal troops to enter the state. While the facts are convoluted, Governor Hicks allegedly gave his consent. On two separate occasions, Hicks said that troops should not be ordered to pass through Maryland and that the state would preserve neutrality between the North and South. Into this fiasco stepped one of the most controversial figures the war would know, lawyer and politician Benjamin F. Butler. As we saw with Cassius Clay of Kentucky and James Lane of Kansas, leaders with political acumen could step into moments that required presence and action to take command and give situational military leadership. Now it was Ben Butler's turn. Butler was from Massachusetts and was a firm Democrat. He rose through the ranks of state leadership and ran unsuccessfully for governor in 1859. While sympathetic to the South, he described himself a friend of Southern rights, but an enemy of Southern wrongs. In appearance, Butler was anything but impressive. Stout and awkward, balding with a droopy mustache, frumpy, pale skinned, he had a lazy eye that gave him a shifty look of shrewdness. And that was his calling card, a clever and sharp manner. This had served him well in politics, and he used connections with bankers to get himself command of Massachusetts militia and traveled south to Philadelphia. But then the railroads around Baltimore were being cut. So Butler and his troops diverted to a ferry and made their way to the capital city of Annapolis, and Governor Hicks. There, Butler's industriousness shifted into high gear. He secured the railway from Annapolis to Washington and then threatened to arrest the Maryland legislature if it voted for secession. Hicks then used Butler's occupying troops and general unrest to convene the legislature to meet in Frederick, in the western part of Maryland. There they voted 53 to 13 against leaving the Union. Maryland would stay. Along with the reopened route for troops to get to Washington, Lincoln had his first glimmer of hopeful news. Had the rising secessionist tide been stopped. As April wound down, Jefferson Davis watched developments around Washington unfold. Hearing of the riot and bloodshed in Baltimore, he telegraphed Governor John Leccher of Virginia on the twenty second, quote, sustain Baltimore if practicable. We will Reinforce you. End quote. While his sentiment was earnest, and he, along with other Southern leaders, hoped that Maryland would join the Confederacy, it was unlikely that Virginians would actually cross the Potomac and invade. Like their northern counterparts, the Southern troops were still in the process of assembling, equipping, drilling, and organizing their forces. Robert E. Lee had just been given command of Virginia's militia, and a few days later, former U.S. Army quartermaster, Joseph Johnston, would be placed in command of the regiments gathering around the state's capital of Richmond. On April 29th, Davis called a special session of the Confederate Provisional Congress to gather in Montgomery. The calendar would soon be turning to May, and it was time for him to respond in reply to Lincoln's proclamation of the 15th and his 20 days notice for the combinations, the opponents of U.S. law, to disperse. With the gathered lawmakers before him, Davis recognized that war had been brought upon the Confederacy and that it was up to the Southern Congress to make plans for the defense of the new country. As he spoke, he affirmed the constitutional functionality of the Confederate government and compared their cause with that of the Founding Fathers and the independence they sought from Great Britain. He reminded them that they had not sought war, but instead had initially sent commissioners to Washington to pursue a path of peace. But in his eyes, Lincoln's response had been anything but peaceful. Davis said, quote, The crooked paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness as was the course of the United States government toward our commission in Washington. We feel that our cause is just and holy. We protest solemnly in the face of mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor and independence. We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the states with which we were lately confederated. All we ask is to be let alone, that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the direct extremity. Davis's speech was significant for several reasons. First, it provided the justification for the call to arms as a mirror to what the Revolutionary War had been about. The rhetoric around the cause echoed the words of Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and John Dickinson. Second, it framed the call to arms as one of defense, to simply keep what was theirs and exist peacefully. Third, it used the first two as the platform for helping legitimize foreign recognition. Slavery was already a strike against the Confederacy on the world stage. Aggression would be another. And fourth, it included the elements that could be pieced together to outline the South's war aims. In his insightful book, Confederate Tide Rising, historian Joseph Harsh unpacks the directives and directions of the South's strategy for the war during 1861 leading into 1862. Using President Davis's speech in Montgomery as a backdrop, there are a few things to consider that give depth and nuance to his picture of the coming fight as a defensive one. Time will demonstrate that choices Davis, his war secretaries, and his generals make might seem to contradict the notion of a defensive war. But let's pay attention to what Davis said and what he didn't say. Davis called the cause one that is just and holy in the pursuit of independence. On one hand, independence had already been achieved, right? New constitution, check, new president, check, new country, check. Well, sort of. As we just saw in Maryland, there was the potential for more independence to happen. There were a few more states that could have some independencing take place. How many more? That was still TBD. The first war aim of the Confederacy was to achieve independence, full independence. Thus he could telegraph the governor of Virginia that Baltimore should be sustained. Is it a defensive war if Southern troops push into border states? No, spatially speaking, and yes, if the aim is achieving independence of further seceding states. Confederate forces marching north would fulfill Davis' vision. He also stated that the South must resist. In other words, control what was within their national border. In his inaugural in February, Davis pointed out the conditional, quote, if the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, end quote, therefore a second war aim would be to seize and hold what was theirs. As a result, the defensive war initially took the initiative to capture not only Fort Sumter, but nearly twenty more forts, eight arsenals, several barracks, a mint, and more than a dozen ships. These were not attacks, per se, but rather preservation of integrity, a resistance of loss. The third aim was unspoken but clearly implied. Davis took great pains to paint the broad stroke of defensiveness, saying, We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement. In other words, we are not the aggressors. But read on. He then clarifies that he was speaking only of the states with which we were lately confederated. In other words, we're not heading to Vermont or Wisconsin. The stand on no conquest, no aggrandizement would not apply to the territories or lands to the west of Texas. That could be open ground for the taking. The route west then through modern New Mexico and Arizona was ripe for conquest, with the Pacific Ocean at the end of the road. And plenty of Southern leaders not only remembered the visions of the 1850s and of slaveholding Cuba and the Nicaraguan filibusters, but still saw aggrandizing opportunities in the Caribbean and Central America. Add all of these war aims up, and the outcome won't look anything like simply defending one's home. While posturing the fight to come as a defensive one, a purely defensive strategy was never the Confederate objective. Also, on Davis's mind, as he gave his speech that day, was a resolution that had just been adopted by the Virginia Secession Convention. Ten days after voting to secede, the Virginians formally invited the Confederate government to relocate and move its capital from Montgomery, Alabama to Richmond, Virginia. The offer of Richmond was an opportunity the new government couldn't easily dismiss. Virginia was now the Confederacy's most prominent state. It had the legacy of its revolutionary heroes and past presidents. It had industrial strength centered on Richmond's Tredeger Ironworks. It had railroads crisscrossing the countryside. It was conducive to shipping along the Atlantic coast, and it had more people than any other southern state. It would also give the Confederacy a seat of government on equal standing with the Union. Richmond was ten times the size of Montgomery, and it was just a hundred miles from Washington. And probably most importantly, it would round out Davis' nation to represent all the South, not just the deep South. It would be a government that was in closer proximity to Britain and France, and one that would be symbolically represented by its new capital. In hindsight, many historians called the move of the Capitol to Richmond a folly. Why put it so close to Washington, so close to the enemy? But the reality was that whether it was the Capitol or not, the Confederacy could not afford to lose Richmond. It would need to be held regardless. It was too important. The choice was easy. Within three weeks, the government would pack its bags and wagons, leave Alabama, and head east to Virginia. While Davis made a speech and Virginia offered Richmond to be the capital of the new nation, Abraham Lincoln waded into one of the most challenging situations he would face during his years as president. As a younger man, Lincoln was renowned for being a wrestler. On hundreds of occasions, he would take part in wrestling matches across central Illinois. It wasn't a profession, but rather entertainment and civic participation, and given his size and strength, he was very good at it. Little did Lincoln know that in the spring of 1861 he was about to wrestle with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Dating back to twelfth century English common law, habeas corpus is foundational to US law. Literally meaning that you have the body, habeas corpus represents the idea that a jailer must bring someone being detained before a judge, that you have the body, so that the legality of imprisonment can be decided. The purpose is to prevent unlawful detention. Section nine of Article I of the US Constitution begins, quote, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended. It's noteworthy that this individual right was assumed when the Constitution was written. It was an existing right, not an invented one. And it's also noteworthy that it was acknowledged in the Constitution before the Bill of Rights was added a few years later. That should indicate how important it was as a check on executive power. It meant that the chief executive, the military, or law enforcement, could not simply detain anyone it wanted. And yet that wasn't all that Section 9, Article 1 said. It continued that the writ shall not be suspended, quote, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. End quote. And now we have the rest of the story. Because if we recall, at the end of April, as Ben Butler reopened transportation lines from Baltimore to Washington, President Lincoln still found himself surrounded on all sides by the threats of secessionists. Sure, Governor Hicks had herded the Maryland legislature to vote to remain in the Union, but many, many Marylanders still refused to support the federal government and vowed to take matters into their own hands. Lincoln was having to switch hats moment by moment, on one hand acting as chief executive, and on the other as commander in chief. He was running a government while dealing with what he saw as an insurrection at the same time. As he surveyed the situation in Maryland in April, deliberating over that mob attack in Baltimore, considering reports of further violence or lawlessness in the cities and towns surrounding the Capitol, he wrote to General Scott on April 27th. The president said that he was, quote, engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the U.S., and that he could suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, end quote. His words are in line with the Constitution, unless you disagree that it was an insurrection. But that's how the president saw it. This fateful decision would set in motion a series of events that still reverberate to this day. On one hand, it put Lincoln into the light of accusations as a military dictator. On the other, it showed him taking responsibility for the protection of the citizens and constitution he swore to defend. Of note, these instructions to General Scott were not made public, nor were the courts informed. Militarily speaking, Lincoln specified that the suspension of habeas corpus was to be effective along the military line from Washington through parts of Maryland and up to Philadelphia, and that an officer in command at any such point was authorized to suspend it. The concept of a military line was to designate a limited area of operations where communications, supply, and transport were necessary for secure military actions. As Lincoln and Scott were depending on troops to move along that line, they needed to ensure that nothing would impede those movements. This was not a blanket suspension across the entire country. It was limited to a line of military operations. If we were to think of war against an enemy nation, it is perfectly reasonable and a wise practice to detain a suspected enemy who might be in the way of friendly forces. Detain first, ask questions later. The mission takes priority. But Maryland was not an enemy nation and its citizens were not enemies, especially not its militia officers. When Governor Hicks originally supported the mayor of Baltimore right after the riot of the 19th, in cutting off the city and state as a through route for Northern troops heading to Washington, orders went out to the Maryland State Militia to destroy several state railroad bridges. Several weeks later, a Pennsylvania general had arrested a lieutenant of the Baltimore County Horse Guards, a militia unit, named John Merriman, due to the destruction of those bridges. Merriman was taken into custody and brought to Fort McHenry in Baltimore, charged with treason and held there by General George Cadwallader. The fact that Merriman may or may not have acted per the governor's alleged orders has never been fully determined one way or the other. Detained as such, Merriman signed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, appealing to know why he was being detained and whether it was lawful. And his lawyers took the petition to Washington and presented it to none other than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Roger B. Tawney. If that name sounds familiar, it should. Chief Justice Tawney had presided over the Dred Scott case four years earlier and had ruled that Dred Scott should remain a slave, and that no black person, slave or free, had been accorded rights of citizenship. It was a divisive, turbulent, and unfortunate opinion. At the time, Supreme Court justices also served as Federal Circuit Court judges, and Maryland was a part of Tawney's Fourth Circuit. So the next day Tani went to Baltimore and had the clerk of the court command General Cadwallader to show up at the Federal Courthouse with John Merriman. When Tawny arrived at the courthouse the following morning, he was greeted not by the general, but by an aide who read a statement noting that Cadwallader was, quote, duly authorized by the President of the United States to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety. Now Lincoln's act was public record. And now General Cadwallader was in contempt of court for failing to produce merrimen. What would Tawney do? He would have to notify the general of his contempt. What would Cadwallader do? With Butler's recent strong actions of precedent, might Cadwallader just decide that Tawney, ever sympathetic to slaveholding interests, was too pro secessionist and posed a threat to public safety. Who might detain who? Once again, Baltimore was poised on the brink of another sort of riot, this one legal. When a U.S. Marshal showed up at the front gate of Fort McHenry to issue the writ of contempt on the general, he was refused entry into the fort. At this point, the marshal could have legally summoned a posse to bring the general to the courthouse. Can you imagine a dozen mounted men trying to storm Fort McHenry to capture the commanding general inside? I don't think that would have gone well. Wisely the marshal left the fort and went back with nothing resolved. Instead of force, Tawney would respond with his pen. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court filed his written opinion with the Circuit Court and argued that the president had overstepped his authority. His opinion stated, first, the suspension language in Article I of the Constitution sits squarely in the context of direction toward the legislative branch of the government. Congress, not the executive. In other words, Lincoln was operating outside of his lane. Second, English history showed not even the Crown had the authority that Lincoln had exercised. It was reserved for Parliament. Lincoln was presuming authority greater than a monarch. Third, he quoted Chief Justice John Marshall, fifty-four years earlier in another case, who said that it was the legislature that would say if public safety required the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln was ignoring history. And fourth, the courts in Baltimore and Maryland were lawful and open for business. Lincoln was circumventing the existing justice system. Tawney's opinion was a legal tour de force. Newspapers weighed in on both sides of the issue as Tawney's full opinion was widely reprinted. A paper's political colors showed whether they celebrated the chief justice as a defender of civil liberties or condemned him as the same partisan and pro slavery mouthpiece who ruled against Dred Scott. And Lincoln did nothing. Because he didn't have to do anything. Tawney could present and state his case, but there was no coercive step open to him. He could only exhort the president to faithfully execute the laws and the civil process of the United States. And so John Merriman remained in custody. And it would be several more weeks until Lincoln would finally respond to the opinion on his actions. Of all days, it would be on the fourth of July. The month of May eighteen sixty one dawned as a mild spring day in Boston as the city prepared for a somber procession. The bodies of the five Massachusetts soldiers killed twelve days before in the streets of Baltimore were brought back to Boston, received and given a military reception and funeral escort through the gathered crowds. Governor John Andrew presided, and the bodies were taken to King's Chapel in the heart of the city. From there processions conveyed the remains to the men's hometowns. The sixth Massachusetts Regimental History recounted that the bodies were draped with the American colors and received with military honors. The buildings along the route were clad in mourning, and flags everywhere were at half mast. The mayors of Lowell and Lawrence were entreated by Governor Andrew that he might assist in the funeral services of the heroic dead. While the sobering reality of the first casualties of conflict spread across Massachusetts, another Northern regiment of soldiers arrived in Washington with an altogether different air of confidence and showmanship. Elmer Ellsworth was twenty four years old and a personal friend of Abraham Lincoln's. Ellsworth had studied law in Spring. Springfield, Illinois, and helped with Lincoln's presidential campaign. He also had a passion for military science and drill. He studied the training of militia and was a drill master for units in Rockford, Illinois, and Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin. Eventually he took over the National Guard Cadets of Chicago and transformed them into the United States Zuv Cadets, a crack military drill team that captivated audiences in performances and parades across Illinois. What was a Zuv? Zuv units were modeled on French North African troops. Beginning in the eighteen thirties, units of European French soldiers and African Berber soldiers from Algeria and Tunisia were organized as light infantry. They served across North Africa and were famous for being highly decorated and elite formations. For those who wanted to inspire other men to be just as effective, Zuvs became a model for high standards, like Army Rangers today. So Ellsworth dressed his militia in exotic uniforms to look like Zuvs, with baggy trousers, short jackets with colorful piping, and sashes, with sometimes a fez or even a turban in place of a cap. He taught and drilled them in the Zuav style, which made them even more famous. After Fort Sumter, Ellsworth returned to his native New York, and through his fame and recognition, quickly raised the 11th New York Volunteers. Made up of the strongest and most fit men from New York City's firefighting companies, they became known as the Fire Zuvs. A thousand men strong and led by the young colonel, the 11th New York arrived in Washington in early May and found itself quartered in the Capitol building, in the chambers of the House of Representatives. Several days later, Ellsworth's men were sworn into federal service under the eye of President Lincoln himself. When a fire broke out at the famous Willard Hotel in the city, the fire zoobs swarmed into action, saving the building and putting out the fire. Ellsworth's profile as friend to the president, crack drill instructor, and fire captain made him an instant celebrity in Washington. He would be sure to further make a name for himself. With more and more troops arriving in the Capitol, Lincoln also needed to start making some decisions. The 20-day ultimatum he had made to the combinations of the Confederacy was up, and the deadline passed without acknowledgement from Jefferson Davis's government as it prepared to move to Richmond, Virginia. There was no going back. Lincoln and the administration had to assess what would be required to put down the insurrection. The original call for 75,000 militia would bring more than 90,000 volunteers under arms to serve the president. But three months would barely be enough time to equip, train, and organize these forces, let alone move them to take back seceded territory or to maneuver against the Confederate forces gathering across the South. What would happen when the clock ran out? Would the armies just go home? That was not a sustainable solution. War Secretary Cameron had already begun to tell Northern governors to stop sending him three-month militia. He wrote to the governor of New Jersey, quote, No further troops beyond the quota of your state can be received at present unless they will agree to volunteer for the period of three years, if not sooner discharged, end quote. On May the 3rd, Lincoln formalized the time frame by issuing another proclamation without any authorization, calling for 80,000 additional troops, 18,000 more to be added to the Navy in its mission to blockade southern ports, 22,000 more to increase the size of the regular Army by 10 regiments, and a further 42,000 volunteers to serve for three years' time. This increase was an instantaneous logistical challenge. As the federal government struggled to purchase and distribute more and more uniforms, weapons, ammunition, supplies, wagons, and food, the states individually had to fill in the gaps. Men signed up so quickly that states struggled to clothe and equip them properly. They were often armed with enthusiasm and little else. While the army took shape, General Scott had to develop an overall strategic recommendation for how to put down the insurrection of the southern states. He knew this new army would need to wage war. But how would it be done? The first priority of cutting the Confederacy off from foreign trade and supply was established by setting up the U.S. Navy to blockade southern ports. Scott also recognized the main artery of trade through the heartland of North America itself, the Mississippi River. The reach of railroads had seen new lines of iron and steel crisscross all across the landscape and connect the cities and towns of America, but for pure volume of transportation, riverborne movement was still the most effective way to move goods and eventually armies across the continent. The Mississippi split the land in two, from north to south, and feeding it was a network of further tributaries that included the Red, Arkansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers. Each of these and many others would factor significantly into how and where armies would go during the war. But it was the Mississippi that Scott would hold as the focus of his planning. He wrote on May 3rd to a 34-year-old officer of his plan to surround and then cut off the vast territory of the Confederacy by choking its ports and controlling the Mississippi River, saying, quote, clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, to envelop the insurgent states and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than any other plan. Scott envisioned a combined operation down the Mississippi, headed by a naval force flanked by 80,000 troops on land in two columns. This should happen in the fall when the rivers would rise. Supplies would be moved by boat, with wagons shuttling material to the armies as they moved. Together all these elements would turn and capture enemy forces and forts as they moved south. Though Scott believed that this force, the largest ever assembled in North America, a massive undertaking, could accomplish the mission, he had one fear that he could not shake. He was not certain that the country would have the patience for what it would take to seize the Mississippi. He would write, quote, A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan, the great danger now pressing upon us, the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences. That thirty-four-year-old officer who Scott shared his plan with was a young protege of his, George B. McClellan. The West Point graduate had been given command of Ohio's militia one day before Pennsylvania's governor had offered him the command of that state's volunteers. McClellan had a front seat to the formulation of the strategic foundation for the war that would become known as General Scott's Anaconda Plan. The Anaconda is a type of South American large boa constrictor that wraps its body around its prey and crushes it to death. The image caught on as Scott's great snake that would surround and constrict the Confederacy into surrender. Eventually, cartoon maps would appear showing a great snake surrounding the South, as well as slithering down the Mississippi to squeeze off smaller sections of territory. But as Scott predicted and wondered, would the North have the patience to allow the strategy to develop and function? As the Northern armies began to swell in number and northern strategy began to take shape, Jefferson Davis also was taking action to deal with the Anaconda Plan. Lincoln's blockade represented military force intended to isolate the South from potential European allies. To address this, Davis appointed a team of three commissioners who would be sent on an important diplomatic mission to procure aid from Britain and France. Given the immediate context of the Confederacy's need for goods, supplies, and material for war, the strong economic ties with countries dependent on Southern Cotton, and the importance of the legitimacy of Davis's vision of independence and inclusion in the world community of nations, it would seem that this mission to Europe should have been of paramount priority. Davis should have sent the best and the brightest of the South's diplomatic minds. It should have demanded maximum effort to produce a favorable outcome. But remember who Jefferson Davis was. He was a soldier. Yes, a politician and a leader, but he had been a Secretary of War, never a Secretary of State. And unfortunately, the lineage of diplomats and U.S. Secretaries of State had run through the North for decades. You'd have to go back to 1844 to find the last Southerner to hold the highest diplomatic post in the land, John C. Calhoun. During the first year of the war, the Confederacy would churn through three different Secretaries of State. So foreign relations would not be a strength for Davis, and he was okay with that. Mainly because there was a deep-seated belief on the part of most Confederate leaders that Europe would look favorably on the Confederacy, would be happy to see the U.S. lose some of its growing power and influence, and would automatically aid its main source of cotton production in the southern states. So Davis chose three men who were undoubtedly loyal but grossly ill suited for such a vital mission. William Yancey from Alabama was first. Remember him? The outspoken fire eater who marched out of the Democratic Convention the year before? One of the pro slavery men who wrecked the Democratic Party? Of course, he should be entrusted to speak with diplomatic tact and sensibility. Not. Then there was Ambrose Dudley Mann from Virginia, who had been an assistant Secretary of State in the eighteen fifties dealing primarily with German states and a treaty with Switzerland. Not an experience, but nothing like a foreign relations heavyweight. And finally, Pierre Adolphe Roast of Louisiana, who had been born in France and knew some leaders there. These were men of convenience, not men of acumen. These three commissioners met in early May with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. But they had been given no specific or direct instructions, and were not empowered with any sort of authority. They were to simply be friendly, play up the value and economic advantages of Southern cotton, and convey the validity and vitality of the Confederate States of America. It was more a PR tour than a serious diplomatic mission. But Lord Russell wouldn't drink the Kool-Aid. He remained vaguely neutral until Queen Victoria herself announced a proclamation of neutrality on may thirteenth that warned British subjects not to aid either the North or South and only recognize the Confederates as belligerents, but not recognition as a nation. The Queen wouldn't meet with the three Southerners, and they would ultimately be politely ignored. Trade would continue with both the North and South, but Britain would remain firmly neutral. In total contrast, Lincoln sent two powerhouse diplomats to Europe on behalf of the U.S. Charles Francis Adams, son and grandson of presidents, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, who did all he could do to maintain ties with Britain, and William Dayton, senator and vice presidential candidate who would lobby French Emperor Napoleon III to avoid Confederate recognition. On this diplomatic scorecard, Lincoln certainly secured the win. The South's foreign relations failure was not Davis' only effort, however, to counter the blockade. As Queen Victoria proclaimed British neutrality, the Confederate President authorized the purchase of six warships abroad. Davis and his Navy Secretary Stephen Mallory knew that they could not compete with Northern shipbuilding to eradicate Lincoln's blockade, but they could purchase raiding vessels that would be able to run the blockade and disrupt Union shipping. However, Britain's neutrality would require a covert plan, including foreign intermediaries, secret contracts, and misleading ship registrations. At the heart of this operation was a 38-year-old naval veteran and businessman from Georgia, James Dunwoody Bullock, who offered his services to the Confederate government in April and was ordered to Montgomery where Navy Secretary Mallory appointed him as Confederate Naval Agent in Europe. Traveling incognito from Charleston through Nassau and on to Liverpool, Bullock set up a commercial office there as a front for his war efforts. For the remainder of the year he developed a rapport with British shipbuilders as a shipping agent. Eventually Bullock would purchase a steamer in Liverpool that would become the CSS Florida. Along with the newly acquired CSS Sumter, which had been bought in New Orleans, the first two ships of Davis' little fleet were readying to begin shipping away at the stranglehold of the Anaconda plan on southern ports. One other little fact about James Dunwoody Bullock, his nephew would someday become the president of the United States. As he had shared with McClellan, besides the blockade, the other part of Scott's strategic plan focused on the Mississippi River. Derived from the Ojibwe term for Big River or Great River, the Mississippi River had, as its most northern, significant city, St. Louis. Just below where both the Illinois and Missouri Rivers joined the Mississippi, St. Louis had become the jumping off point for Lewis and Clark's expedition decades before, and would grow into the base of operations for numerous others. Though Jefferson City would become the centrally located capital of Missouri in 1825, St. Louis would definitely be the gateway city to both the state and the Western U.S. throughout the 1800s. Most importantly, for a nation facing an insurrection in the spring of 1861, St. Louis was headquarters for the U.S. Army's Department of the West, based at Jefferson Barracks. Nearby was the St. Louis Arsenal, which held over 60,000 weapons and was the largest manufacturer of arms and munitions west of the Appalachians. And in command at St. Louis was Lincoln's and Scott's other high-ranking general, Brigadier General William Harney. A forty year veteran of fighting in Mexico and along the frontier, Harney was originally from Tennessee, a southerner, which could be a sticking point against his loyalty and held against him in the coming months. But if General Scott's plan of advancing down the Mississippi was to become a reality, then St. Louis and Harney's position there would become supremely important to developments in Missouri. Perhaps Harney would become a great Napoleon for the Union by capturing the Mississippi, or not. Because there was another and more fiery officer in St. Louis, a younger officer and one who had far more influential political connections than Harney did. Nathaniel Lyon was a West Point graduate from Connecticut, who had also fought in Mexico and served on the Great Plains. Witnessing firsthand the effects of the fighting in Bleeding, Kansas in the eighteen fifties, he became a strong opponent of slavery and supported the newly formed Republican Party. Before the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lyon had written about the crisis of secession, saying, quote, it is no longer useful to appeal to reason, but to the sword. Lyon was also close friends with Francis Preston Blair Jr., the son of Lincoln's friend who had offered Lee command of the U.S. Army. The son, known also as Frank Blair, served as a congressman from Missouri while his brother would land on Lincoln's cabinet. To say the Blairs were powerfully connected would be an understatement. They were strategic, influential, and involved both in Washington and the West. Frank Blair had organized thousands of wide awakes. Remember those Republican marching clubs in 1860? And he had tapped into the growing German community in St. Louis to form a pro-unionist bloc, to oppose most of the state government, which was pro-slavery. Though Missouri hadn't seceded, its governor, Claiborne Jackson, tried to push the needle for his state to join the Confederacy. He refused to answer Lincoln's call for volunteers. While Maryland's Governor Hicks had managed to keep his state on the side of the Union, how would Missouri's Governor Jackson manage the tension in his border state? Would there now be a bleeding Missouri? To boost Union morale, Frank Blair got his man, Nathaniel Lyon, assigned to command the arsenal in St. Louis, much to Harney's chagrin, who wanted to just keep the peace. In response, Governor Jackson assumed control of the St. Louis police, activated the pro southern Missouri State Guard, and set up a camp, named after himself, Camp Jackson, as an assembly point outside the city. Jackson had drawn a line in the sand. The governor had written Jefferson Davis I am not now without hope that she, Missouri, will promptly take her stand with her southern sister states. The arsenal at St. Louis, now under the command of an abolition officer, Lyon, it is feared will be greatly in our way, in the event of active hostilities being commenced against the Confederate states. To remove this obstacle, it will probably become necessary to have a few large guns to batter down its walls and drive out our enemies. Jackson's response and show of strength caused Lyon to arm his Unionists until Harney, as department commander, gave him direct orders to stand down. Up to this point, it's important to remember that neither side, Jackson's or Lyons, had any legal basis for what they were planning. It was a lot of saber rattling and threats, and Harney needed to de-escalate the situation. But Frank Blair was not a fan of Harney's, and using his political influence, he got the War Department to temporarily remove Harney from command. With the voice of moderation now silenced, Lyon moved into action. On May 10, 1861, Lyon led his infantry regiment and his home guard of Germans out of the city to surround Camp Jackson, where he forced it and its pro Southern forces to surrender. After rounding Up his prisoners, Lyon then returned to St. Louis, where he made a show of paroling them. This drew angry shouts from pro-Southern citizens, most of which were directed at the damn Dutch, or the Hessians, as the Germans were called. And then rocks and debris started to fly. Yelling turned to pushing, punching turned to throwing projectiles, and then gunfire erupted. The riot turned to pandemonium as more than a hundred civilians were killed and wounded. This was Baltimore all over again, but on a much larger scale. The city went into a tense lockdown overnight until the next day when violence resumed. More shots were fired, and rumors of renegade Germans murdering Southern sympathizers put the city in a panic until order was maintained. Harney was reinstated to command in the nick of time and signed a truce with the Missouri State Guard that would keep some semblance of peace and which would give the U.S. Army control of St. Louis and leave the rest of the state to the state forces. That was the final straw for Blair and Lyon. Not only was control given back to Governor Jackson's forces, but Harney, the Tennessean, the Southerner, in their minds, stood in the way of the federal government exercising its proper authority. Frank Blair outlined what had happened in detail and lobbied Lincoln to have Harney removed permanently. This was done on May 31st, and Nathaniel Lyon took command of the Department of the West. Missouri was becoming an echo of what was taking place in Maryland in terms of federal presence securing a key base of operations. Mob violence had caused a spark of violence in both Baltimore and St. Louis. The latter city was strategically important like Washington, D.C. Both were surrounded by potential border state threats. Lyon was playing the strong federal military role in Missouri of Ben Butler in Maryland. The main difference was the amount of territory that needed to be secured. And the Potomac provided a natural barrier for the Capitol and Maryland, whereas Missouri was spread out wide across the front of St. Louis and controlled by the Missouri State Guard. As the president turned his focus back to securing the Capitol, the question for Lincoln around DC now was, would the Potomac River be enough of a geographical barrier and deterrent to stop the secessionists from launching an attack on Washington. Farther west, along the Upper Potomac, Robert Patterson was busy with an 18,000 man militia army, keeping an eye on the Shenandoah Valley and the vital point of Harper's Ferry. Scott had ordered Patterson not to advance or get into a battle, just to hold his position and keep the Confederates there from leaving and reinforcing the rebel army gathering at Manassas. Standing Pat aligned perfectly with Patterson's temperament. But along the lower Potomac might aggressive Southern attitudes take on the form of an assault on DC. Directly across the Potomac from Washington were the city of Alexandria, Virginia, and the heights of the Arlington Estate, home to Robert E. Lee. The high ground of the position dominated Washington. If Confederate artillery were positioned there on the heights, the city could be bombarded. Arlington also overlooked the Long Bridge and Aqueduct Bridge, the two ways to get across the Potomac without a boat. Losing those bridges would create an immediate problem for any troops trying to get into Virginia. Securing Arlington and Alexandria was not a matter of if but when for Lincoln and Scott. The citizens of Virginia helped make that decision when on May 23, 1861, they officially voted more than three to one to ratify the ordinance of secession. The following day, the twenty fourth, the War Department ordered Federal forces across the Potomac to seize the area along the southern bank, including Arlington and Alexandria. The bridges would be secured and the high ground occupied, Washington would be much safer. Part of the occupying federal column included the eleventh New York, the very famous fire Zuvs led by young Colonel Ellsworth. The night before, having received instructions for the advance the following day, Ellsworth penned two letters, one to his fiancee and one to his parents. To his father and mother he wrote Whatever may happen, cherish the consolation that I was engaged in the performance of a sacred duty, and tonight, thinking over the probabilities of the morrow and the currences of the past, I am perfectly content to accept whatever my fortune may be, confident that he who noteth even the fall of a sparrow will have some purpose even in the fate of one like me. As Ellsworth's Zuavs formed up that morning, several noticed through their field glasses a large Confederate flag that flew over the Marshall House, a prominent inn near the riverfront in Alexandria. For Ellsworth, the flag was a symbol of insurrection and an offense to his duty to the Union. Once the Zuavs crossed the river and took positions in the town, Ellsworth took a detachment of seven soldiers with him, and made a beeline for the marshal house. Entering the building through an open door, the young colonel came across a man startled by the appearance of armed soldiers. Ellsworth asked him pointedly, what kind of flag flew over the inn? The man said he didn't know. He was only a guest staying there. Ellsworth pushed past the man and clambered up the stairs with his men following. Using a ladder, they navigated the roof and used a soldier's knife to cut the flag down. Ellsworth triumphantly gathered the rebel banner up and headed back inside. Following one of his Zuvs down the stairs, the colonel reached the first floor landing when, suddenly, a figure stepped forward with a double barreled gun. The man fired a blast directly into Ellsworth's chest, killing him instantly, then turned and fired at the other soldier, but missed. The Zuv fired back, hitting the assailant in the face. The body fell and the soldier ran him through with his bayonet. Shouts of confusion gave way to the realization of what had just happened. Ellsworth's men carried the colonel's body out, and it was eventually transported back to Washington. Lincoln was deeply grieved for his friend, and Ellsworth's body would lie in state in the East Room of the White House. He was the first officer to die on either side, and the cry Remember Ellsworth became a rallying call to action. It was like the Alamo, Pearl Harbor, or nine eleven at the time. His image appeared in woodcut on the front page of the New York Tribune with the headline reading The Murder of Colonel Ellsworth, tearing down the rebel flag, punishment of the murderer. The North now had its first fallen hero. But so did the South. The man who killed Ellsworth was James Jackson, the inn's owner. He reportedly said when he put up the flag that the only way it would come down would be over his dead body. In the Southern press, Jackson was a martyr for Southern independence while defending his personal property. Blood had now been spilled in Baltimore, in St. Louis, and now in Virginia. The wages of the upcoming fight were utterly unimaginable to Americans in the spring of 1861. Each death so far had become a headline for newspapers, a symbol for a cause, a shock and sorrow to a populace who heard the news. But for the professional soldiers, those trained and skilled in the art and science of war and of killing, the first few dead were just that, the first few. And already planners in the war department, planners who understood the reality of warfare, were taking steps to handle the gruesome work of the dead and wounded they knew would only increase. Dorothea Dix had been a tireless advocate and reformer for the care of the poor and mentally ill for decades leading up to the Civil War. Though not a nurse herself, she was assertive in her principles who had a fan in Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War. At the beginning of June, Cameron appointed Dix as superintendent of Army nurses, who established guidelines and would eventually accept 3,000 women into the medical service. Soon thereafter, a group of influential Northerners formed the U.S. Sanitary Commission, a private relief agency designed to support sick and wounded soldiers. Modeled on a British version of the same, the Sanitary Commission would initially supply and support hospitals, as well as study the quality of health and care provided to the Army. Although many politicians and the majority of the population couldn't fathom how much and the types of death a war would produce, the groups committed to preparing for care would have an invaluable effect as the years would pass and the war would continue. We began this episode by talking about the legend of Napoleon, having captured the imaginations of the people and leaders of the North and South at the start of the Civil War. As both sides looked for the great man who would lead them to victory, let's do a quick assessment of who we've met so far and hand out some Napoleonic great man grades. In the North, President Lincoln was either a careful commander in chief or a borderline dictator, depending on how you interpreted his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. He was certainly a skillful politician and savvy lawyer who had zero formal military training, but he also was a voracious learner, and he took to studying a book titled Elements of Military Art and Science to beef up his understanding. Let's grade him on a Napoleonic scale, a B for bold leadership, but a D for military and experience, but with plenty of potential for improvement. General Scott had scored an A a dozen years before when he had captured Mexico City. But a failed political career and now physical deterioration had taken their toll. Let's grade him a B minus with, at his age, no chance of improving that score. Robert Patterson, though a lifetime military man, was simply drafting in Scott's wake, and had never led anything like an army in campaign or in battle. Right now we'll give him a C minus. And William Harney was the same, and from Tennessee, which didn't help. Call him a D plus, and he was already shown the door. The politician general Ben Butler was an intriguing figure who was assertive, understood politics, and unexpectedly was leading soldiers with some sense of effectiveness in Baltimore and Maryland. We'll give him a C plus with some promise. And Nathaniel Lyon was effectively leveraging his political connections, aggressively tangling with opponents in Missouri, and knew a bit of what he was doing militarily. Lyon may have been the brightest star for the Union in May of 1861. He gets a solid B. In the South, President Jefferson Davis was bordering on a non-campaigning version of Napoleon himself, leading a new government, leveraging his military acumen by organizing his nation's armies, yet declining offers to take command himself. While certainly a B, he'll get a B minus for not seeing himself as a battlefield presence. Pierre Gustave Dutan Beauregard was already the South's high flying hero. The victor of Fort Sumter would have the year of Davis and was already devising plans for action to win the war. In May, Beauregard was given command of the army gathering in Northern Virginia at Manassas Junction, a key railroad intersection and just over thirty miles from Washington. By physical appearance, he would have fit perfectly on Emperor Napoleon III's staff. Beauregard's the closest thing we've got to the original Napoleon so far. A minus. Joe Johnston and Robert E. Lee, two career soldiers with plenty of fighting spirit and know-how, were so far just treading water, solid but unremarkable sea grades so far. And coloring most of the men we've just looked at is one shared and common reference point, that being West Point, the United States Military Academy. Established in 1802 by Thomas Jefferson, about 50 miles north of New York City on the Hudson River, the Academy was to train and educate a professional officer corps for the U.S. Army. Like similar academies in Europe, it provided a foundation of expertise in engineering and military sciences that would serve the new country well through the rapid growth and expansion of the early 19th century. And by the Civil War, forty years worth of leaders had been shaped and directed by what they learned at West Point and what they experienced in command. And again, so much of what they learned was a byproduct of Enlightenment principles of warfare and was influenced by Napoleon. Engineering stressed the mathematical and geometric precision of fortifications, and this extended into the geometry of how armies should operate in the field. If a map was drawn to represent the movements and positions of Napoleon's armies during one of his campaigns, one would use lines and shapes on a map to locate assembly areas, bases of operation, and then lines of advance, connecting that base to geographic objectives. Lines of operations would include lines of supply and lines of communication, and these lines needed to be protected and defended so that an advance would not be put in jeopardy. Most important would be concentrating one's forces at a decisive point to achieve superiority against the opponent. This was called the fundamental point of war by Baron Antoine Henri Jomigny, a Swiss officer who had served under Napoleon and had written the treatise on grand military operations, which greatly influenced the instruction on strategy and tactics at West Point. Jominy's science of a modern system of marches, combined with the engineering sciences, gave every professional officer from West Point a disciplined mindset based on principles and theories to be put into practice. Jomini even wandered into his own version of great man theory when he wrote of Napoleon's genius. Quote The adventurous character of this great man, his personal situation and the tone of the French mind all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. This is probably true, but between the extremes of very distant invasions and wars of position, there is a proper mean and without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. In addition to Jomigny, cadets at West Point would have also been familiar with the histories of the Prussian king Frederick the Great, the Austrians who campaigned in Italy against Bonaparte, and surely Napoleon's own writings on war called simply his maxims. The obvious great irony to all this science and training was that the U.S. Army was nothing like Napoleon's or any other European great army. The American army in 1860 did not exist or operate in large unit formations. It was actually made up of scattered commands and companies across the frontier and coastal forts of the country. Remember, Major Anderson led only about 80 men at Fort Sumter when it was attacked? Rarely was an entire regiment even assembled together. So all the subjects taught at West Point, engineering, weaponry, military culture and routine, unit drill, sketching and map reading, and small unit tactics were held up against the backdrop of Napoleon's great encirclement of the Austrians at Ulm or his masterpiece Battle of Austerlitz, and then these new lieutenants would graduate and go to a small outpost in Texas or Oregon or sit at a desk somewhere. It was the war with Mexico in 1846 and 47 that proved the great test, to see if American, mostly volunteer, armies helmed by professional officers and staff trained at West Point would make any difference at all. In a year and a half of fighting, and generally outnumbered in many major battles, the Americans won the war and captured Mexico City. This in part due to higher morale and initiative of officers, better artillery and tactics, and superior training and discipline. These qualities had been infused in them at West Point, and fighting in Mexico proved their mettle. And that war had served as a bridge to take the Army at the start of the Civil War from the generation of Winfield Scott, officers in their 60s and 70s, to the next generation of officers in their 50s, forties, and even 30s. On may thirteenth, 1861, orders were issued in Washington to create a new military department of the Ohio that would combine the states along the northern shore of the Ohio River, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, into a single department. And the new commander would be General George B. McClellan. Remember him? The protege of Scott's who was present for the development of the General's Anaconda Plan. McClellan's father had been friends with Scott, and the son would always look up to the old general, writing him in 1861, quote, next to maintaining the honor of my country, the first aim of my life is to justify the good opinion you have expressed concerning me. End quote. Within several months, the young McClellan had gone from civilian railroad superintendent to Ohio's commander of militia, to now head of the Army units across the heart of the country. Nicolay and Hay cite McClellan's rapid advance in terms of how badly both the North and the South wanted to find their next great man. Quote Captain McClellan had been commissioned by the governor as major general and thus placed in command of the whole quota assigned to that state, consisting of thirteen regiments of three months militia, a small army and itself. To rise at once in a rank from a captaincy to a major generalship, from the command of one hundred men to the command of ten thousand, is an event that deserves to be classed among the extravagances of fiction rather than the prosaic possibilities of our modern life. Yet the War of Rebellion furnished a number of parallel or approximate instances, for to the armies that rose at the president's call, as by the sweep of an enchanter's wand, general officers were as indispensable as muskets. Likewise, a commander needed to be found for the gathering army at Washington. Scott was about to appoint a commander who was pushing 60 until War Secretary Cameron and Treasury Secretary Chase leaned on him, applied some pressure, and pointed at a fellow Ohioan who was younger and promising, who had studied in France and served as an assistant adjutant general, Major Irvin McDowell. And while he had no field command experience, neither did nearly all the other options. There's a story that Union General William T. Sherman told his brother, Senator John Sherman, in a letter in May of 1861. Sherman knew McDowell well. Both were from Ohio and they were cadets together at West Point. But Sherman had been stationed in California during the war with Mexico and was not Battle tested, like so many of his fellow West Pointers. Because of the self-awareness, Sherman declined promotion to general when the army was quickly elevating badly needed commanders. Sherman recounted to his brother how he bumped into McDowell shortly after the latter's promotion. McDowell greeted his friend and inquired, Well, hello, Sherman, what did you ask for? Sherman replied, A colonel C. McDowell was surprised. What? You should have asked for a brigadier general's rank. You're just as fit for it as I am. I know it, Sherman countered. His qualifications for promotion aside and appointed a brigadier general, McDowell was given command of Northeast Virginia on May 28th. Immediately he went about organizing his regiments into brigades and fortifying his position around Alexandria. Between McClellan along the Ohio and McDowell in Northern Virginia, would one or both of these new commanders prove to be effective generals from the next generation of West Point leaders? The next day, Jefferson Davis arrived in his new capital. Richmond, Virginia rose and fell along the James River across several hills, one of which boasted the State Capitol building that was now the country's capital, patterned after a Roman temple designed by Thomas Jefferson. Richmond was five times the size of Montgomery, boasting a population of nearly 40,000, and more than 13,000 were black, and a fifth of those being free. One of the largest flour mills in the entire world was the Galago Flour Mill in Richmond. The Tredeger Ironworks rivaled the largest in Britain and in the north, and it would produce half of all the cannon used by the Confederacy. Its tobacco market didn't just export raw leaf, but also led in production of cigars, snuff, and the lucrative business of chewing tobacco. Along with New Orleans and Charleston, Richmond was a crown jewel of the Confederacy, and now it was its capital. Taking up residence, Davis quickly organized his gathering military forces. Lee was in formal command of all the Virginia troops, but now the president was close enough to communicate directly with Beauregard, who commanded at Manassas Junction. Davis also had sent Joseph E. Johnston to take command at Harper's Ferry. He had two of his most proven generals in Beauregard and Johnson in place at the most critical spots in Virginia, and he was present now to advise and direct as needed. And while the Confederate Army was taking shape, the Navy Yard in Norfolk witnessed its own sort of resurrection. On may thirtieth, the wreckage of the U.S. steam frigate Merrimack had been razed from the riverbed by the Baker Wrecking Company and moved into Drydock. Remember how Confederate Navy Secretary Mallory was desperately trying to create a small fighting navy that could challenge the U.S. blockade? While he had James Bullock, now in England doing the methodical work of acquiring ships under the radar, that would take time. Mallory had just learned that plans to construct an ironclad warship in Virginia would take a full year. That was time he didn't have, until he saw the Merrimack sitting there in Drydock. Could he repurpose the Merrimack and rebuild it as a new Confederate warship in a fraction of the time? It was an answer he already knew. Mallory ordered his engineers to make it so. As Americans picked up their newspapers in early June, they read the news of the passing of one who had been a promising great man of history for a decade, a man who shaped the country in the eighteen fifties and who seemed to be destined for the presidency. Stephen A. Douglas, the Democrat and Senator from Illinois, famous debater with Lincoln and considered a sure pick for president in eighteen sixty, had been in failing health since campaigning before the recent election. In May he was bedridden by illness and then succumbed to typhoid fever, dying at his home in Chicago on june third, eighteen sixty one. Only forty eight, he would not live to see the outcome of the conflict he tried to avoid. War Secretary Cameron remembered Douglas as a man who discarded party for his country. Americans would have also read in their papers highly important news, that's the way the New York Times put it, that quote, two thousand rebels routed in Western Virginia, the rebel camp at Philippa broken up, route of the rebels, Colonel Kelly of the First Virginia Regiment killed. End quote. This was news of the first organized land battle of the Civil War, and it had occurred in Western Virginia on June 3rd. What had happened? Let's clean up that headline a bit to correct that the place was Philippi, that there were about 800 Confederates present, not a couple thousand, and that the Federal Colonel Kelly wasn't killed but wounded. General McClellan, now commanding the Department of the Ohio, at his headquarters in Cincinnati, had been directed by General Scott to move troops to support the Unionist presence in the western counties of Virginia. When the citizens of the state voted on the referendum to secede, most of the Western population wanted to stay in the Union. But Virginia militia were moving to seize and hold the vital Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that connected Washington to the states of Ohio and beyond. McClellan quickly sent about 2,000 men to protect the railroad, which they did. When the Confederates realized numbers were against them, they pulled back to Philippi. There the Federal troops launched a two-pronged attack that surprised the rebels and sent them running from the field in disarray. With a couple casualties from the Union and more for the Confederates, the battle was really more of a very light skirmish than a battle, but it was fighting nonetheless. And the papers hailed it as a great victory, calling it the Philippi Races, as the rebels raced away as fast as they could. The country could now feel the tension of armies moving into the field and Lincoln's and Davis' war aims turning into action. In this case, both sides wanted to control a vital railroad, and the result was combat. The following week it was the Confederacy's turn to have the newspapers headline a military victory. The Richmond Dispatch proclaimed on June 11th, quote, Battle at Bethel Church, authentic account, advance of the Northern forces, heavy cannonading heard, glorious victory, the Yankees completely routed and cut to pieces. In May, once the situation had stabilized in Maryland, General Scott had transferred Ben Butler from there down to Fort Monroe. Located at the mouth of the James River where it emptied into Chesapeake Bay, it dominated the seaward approaches to Hampton Roads, the entrance to the harbors of Norfolk and Portsmouth. Immediately after Fort Sumter, Scott had reinforced Fort Monroe, mostly referred at the time as Fortress Monroe, and the position was never lost to the Virginia militia. Especially with the loss of the Navy Yard just to the south, holding Fortress Monroe was vital to maintaining the blockade, and it provided a secure forward operating base on southern soil. General Butler was collecting regiments from Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont, along with regular Army units at the fort. In order to strengthen his position, he began to send units up north, up the peninsula toward modern Newport, News, Virginia. As Butler created camps and outposts for his expanding bridgehead, General Lee ordered about 1,500 Virginia and North Carolina troops down the peninsula to halt Butler's advance. At Big Bethel Church in the early dark on June 10th, 3,500 Union troops stumbled into the Confederates. Unfamiliar with the ground, a New York regiment accidentally fired into another New York regiment. After this tragedy of friendly fire, the Yankees ran into stiff fortifications and could make no progress. Though they fought for several hours, Butler's men withdrew back to Fortress Monroe. Criticized for not leading the attack in person, Butler was fortunate that casualties again were very light, 76 total with 18 men killed. The Confederates had one man killed and seven wounded. Again, the headlines make Big Bethel sound like a clash of Titanic armies, like a Waterloo. It wasn't, but after the loss at Philippi, the Southern press could punch back at Butler's Bungle. Americans had to wonder where the next spark would be to light the fire of combat. In Missouri, things had settled down into an uneasy stalemate after all the violence in St. Louis in May. Frank Blair and General Lyon met with Governor Jackson and General Sterling Price, the commander of the Missouri State Guard, in the city for four hours on June 11th. The agreement that General Harney had put into place to keep the peace was completely unacceptable to Lyon. U.S. forces had the legal authority to move anywhere within the state. Jackson reminded him of the agreement. It was an impasse. Lyon ended the meeting stating that this means war, and both sides departed. Jackson and Price returned to Jefferson City and then left the Capitol to take position in Boonville, 50 miles up the Missouri River, trying to buy some time to assemble more State Guard troops. Lyon was ready to drive the pro-Southerners from the state. He steamed up the river to take the Capitol and then marched on Boonville, where on June 17th, his 1,700 men drove Governor Jackson's militia away in less than a few hours. With a dozen casualties on each side, it was another light skirmish. Lyon's star continued to rise as he had just secured the Missouri River and the center of the state for the Union. Governor Jackson would have to go elsewhere to gather a secessionist movement strong enough to challenge Blair and Lyon for control of Missouri. In Washington, Lincoln monitored the ebb and flow of advances and setbacks, all the while preparing for his address to the special session of Congress he had called for the Fourth of July. A few days before, the president expanded his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus from beyond the line from Philadelphia to the Capitol to now a further line extending all the way to New York City. This was done to secure the entire transportation corridor from the largest city in the U.S. to the Capitol, as Lincoln was grappling with changing intelligence about Confederate sympathizers and conspirators who might try to stop the movement of men and material from the North. When his address was read aloud to Congress on July 4th by a clerk, Lincoln took the attitude of a confident president dealing with a very and real urgency, much to the disappointment of many and Chief Justice Tony, who wanted a full accounting of his actions, especially those they saw in violation of the Constitution. The first half of the president's message recounted all that had taken place in the four months since his inauguration. And let's not forget what a list it was. The second half laid out Lincoln's legal and political argument against secession's legitimacy. But nearing the midway point of the address, Lincoln addressed the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Merriman case. Firmly identifying the present threat to the country, he said it was, quote, a case of rebellion. Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people or too weak to maintain its own existence? End quote. His argument was one from the unique military present, not the general legal past. For more than a month, Lincoln was in conference with his cabinet and especially Attorney General Edwin Bates, who would issue his own 20-page opinion on the president's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. That would give the backstory for Lincoln's attitude on his developing war powers. Bates reasoned that any arguments back to English history and law didn't apply to the president of an entirely separate and different country, who was the only person entrusted with the order to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. And then, in his capacity as commander in chief, his duty to locate spies or other treasonous persons who might threaten the authority of the three equal branches of government would compel him to take preventative steps in that circumstance. In other words, Chief Justice Tani, in the current state of insurrection, if a potential traitor should threaten your court, is it not within the president's responsibility to arrest and confine that traitor first to ensure the functionality of the justice system? The state of matters in July 1861 was uncharted constitutional territory for the country and its president, and he would do what he had to. But knowing that charges of being a despot could be brought against him, Lincoln also said, quote, these measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then as now that Congress would ratify them. He was not doing an end around against Congress, although he was pushing it, but he knew he had congressional support. He called the imminent fight a people's contest and plainly requested $400 million and armies of four hundred thousand troops to cover the war. Congress approved and moved forward with sharpness toward any border state politicians or peace democrats who might oppose. Lincoln's realistic assessment of Scott's understanding of the cost of war would be a tough pill for anyone who held to a popular and romantic notion of a bloodless conflict. Out of the public eye a few weeks later, John Merriman was released from Fort McHenry and posted bond. He returned home as Chief Justice Tawney weighed whether or not to proceed with his case. But the moment had passed. Baltimore and Maryland had chosen to remain in the Union, and the growing military presence demonstrated to everyone that concerns for security and accurate intelligence would have made a trial impossible. Ultimately, Tawney got what he wanted constitutionally for John Merriman. As for the president, what would happen next would ultimately render the verdict on Lincoln's actions. The press, as usual, was divided, depending on who was printing the paper. Horace Greeley's New York Tribune would defend the president's firm measures. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin identified and voiced the very real tension if and when suspension of the writ would apply to newspaper publishers themselves when it wrote in August, quote, If printers of treasonable articles are really traitors, they have no rights, which the government is bound to respect. But the case is not free from difficulty, and the forcible suppression of a press in any of the northern states is an act which ought to be guarded and watched with extreme jealousy. End quote. The context of a nation at war coming to grips with insurrectionary division would lead its leaders and peoples to begin shifting their words toward stronger language. Lincoln had said in his message, quote, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. It might seem of little difference whether the present movement at the South be called secession or rebellion. With the turning of the calendar to July, a brilliant cosmic wonder blazed across the skies and seemed to announce to the world that something was about to happen. On june thirtieth, what became known as the Great Comet of 1861 streaked across the heavens. For several days the Earth was actually within the comet's tail, giving rise to meteor showers and streaks of light in the sky. On board the CSS Sumter, the first of Davis's six warships of the Confederate Navy, Commander Raphael Semmes piloted his steam cruiser out of New Orleans to run the Federal blockade. During this breakout voyage, Semmes wrote, The sun had gone down behind a screen of purple and gold, and to add to the beauty of the scene as night set in, a blazing comet, whose tail spanned nearly a quarter of the heavens, mirrored itself within a hundred feet of our little bark as she ploughed her noiseless way through the waters. And then the next evening, day passed into night, and with the night came the brilliant comet again, lighting us on our way over the waste of waters. Down at Fort Jefferson, in the dry Tortugas west of Key West, Florida, Mrs. Emily Holder, wife of the physician of the fort, wrote, quote, its appearance was sublime, as it extended over nearly half of the heavens. Many wondered if the world was not coming to an end. And a journalist at the New York Herald echoed Mrs. Holder's prophetic attitude when a story appeared in its July 4th issue, describing the quote, celestial visitor that has sprung upon us with such unexampled brilliancy and magnitude, causing those who regard it with fear, looking upon it as something terrible, bringing in its train wars and desolation. Prophetic or not, there would be no question that the month of July, following Lincoln's message to Congress, political and media rhetoric and the military buildup was turning the course of events toward a new and combustible path. Those initial 75,000 militia Lincoln had called for back on April 15th would be done and mustered out of service in a couple of weeks if nothing happened. General Scott and his team of commanders, McDowell in Northeastern Virginia, Patterson watching the Shenandoah, McClellan along the Ohio, and Lyon in Missouri, would have to act soon to prove how bloodless and effortless it would be to scatter the insurrectionists. Congress had approved Lincoln with money and more men. Time was now the challenge. It was General McClellan who took the initiative right away. He had left his headquarters in Cincinnati to personally take command in Western Virginia following the first combat there. After the skirmish at Philippi in June, the Confederates sent General Robert Garnett with reinforcements to better hold the region for the South. In early July, McClellan devised a plan for his 7,000 troops to move down the Tigart River Valley in columns to drive Garnett away. On the 5th, McClellan wrote to Scott, describing his strategic approach and affirming the old general as his teacher and mentor. If we listen carefully, we'll hear trademark core beliefs that will continue to flow from McClellan's pen. Quote No prospect of a brilliant victory shall induce me to depart from my intention of gaining success by maneuvering rather than by fighting. I am trying to follow a lesson long ago learned from him, i. e. not to move until I know that everything is ready, and then move with utmost rapidity and energy. It would be exceedingly foolish to give way to impatience and advance before everything was prepared. With fellow West Pointer William Rosecrans commanding one of his brigades, McClellan outmaneuvered Garnett at Laurel Hill, forcing the Confederates out of his position. Rosecrans then drove back Garnett's brigade under Colonel John Pegram at Rich Mountain, capturing the rebel officer. These back to back victories affirmed what McClellan had told his army at the start of the campaign, saying, Soldiers, I have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. I fear now but one thing, that you will not find foamen worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you. End quote. Two days later, McClellan's forces pursued Garnett to Corick's Ford on the Cheat River. The fighting became ongoing running combat as Southerners fought and then retired with Union troops in hot pursuit. As Garnett formed his men up for another defensive line, McClellan's soldiers opened fire, killing Garnett. He was the first general in the Officer of the war to die in combat. His army dissolved and fled to the south. The three days of fighting in Western Virginia saw about 60 Northern casualties, more than 300 Southern, and over a thousand Confederates captured or missing. It was a decisive operation, and the Union firmly controlled Western Virginia. McClellan issued a proclamation to his army on july sixteenth. Soldiers of the Army of the West, I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, entrenched in mountain fastnesses, fortified at their leisure. You have proved that Union men fighting for the preservation of our government are more than a match for our misguided and erring brethren. In the future I may still have greater demands to make upon you, and still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability, but I now know that by your valor and endurance you will accomplish all that is asked. In light of his rousing words, it's important to remember that most of McClellan's army hadn't been engaged, and it wasn't like he was storming the beaches of Normandy. But these were three victories nonetheless that demonstrated that Union command, will, and manpower could take and hold contested territory. And now, after months of ups and downs, the North had a winner. Newspapers fawned over his accomplishments. The Louisville Journal wrote of McClellan, quote, there was something extremely satisfactory in contemplating what might be called a piece of finished military workmanship by a master hand, end quote. And the New York Herald went one step further on july fifteenth when a headline proclaimed, quote, General McClellan, the Napoleon of the present war. Now we have it. Had the great man now arrived upon the stage of American history? Was this the moment Thomas Carlisle would stand up and point at McClellan's skills and qualities, his courage, intellect, decisiveness, charisma, and his ability to think strategically? The New York Herald seemed to think so. At the very same time, newspapers across the North were looking at the calendar and demanding action toward the new Confederate Capitol. The Southern Congress was planning on meeting on July 20th, in Richmond, to open its first session since the government had relocated there, and Northerners wanted to seize the city before that could happen. Successes in Western Virginia gave the North a vision for equal success in the eastern part of the state. Horace Greeley ran a headline on his New York Tribune on the 14th that exhorted, forward to Richmond. The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there. Forward to Richmond, forward to Richmond. The cry wasn't just based on desire. The fact of the matter was that General McDowell would be in command of the largest single American army ever assembled. George Washington during the Revolutionary War at the most led perhaps 28,000 men in the fighting around New York in 1776. The War of 1812 saw no more than about 15,000 troops in a single American army. Same thing for the Army General Scott led during the war with Mexico. But in July of 1861, Irvin McDowell would have 35,000 men under his authority. When all of these factors were added up, the momentum of McClellan's victories in Western Virginia, the imminent gathering of the Confederate Congress, and the presence of the largest American army ever, how could action not be taken? And now we recall Scott's greatest fear for the conduct of the war, the Union's inability to be patient. Would there be consequences for impatience? Forward to Richmond, the headlines read. Forward to Richmond, the politicians demanded. And so on july sixteenth, McDowell received his direct order to move his army south, toward Manassas Junction, with the objective of defeating any Confederates and continuing on to Richmond. Would the assembled Union forces, the Federal Army, the Yankees, overcome the gathering Confederate Army, the Southerners, the rebels? Would the Napoleons of the North overcome the Napoleons of the South? All eyes turned toward Northern Virginia, and the populations of the Union and Confederacy braced themselves for the battle that they believed would end the war. What can we learn from the three month period between Fort Sumter and the impending fight at Manassas? I suppose both presidents, Lincoln and Davis, demonstrated a distinct capacity for thinking outside the box when faced with a situation that the reality hadn't anticipated. Lincoln made a bold decision when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus because the demands of being commander in chief had to influence his being chief executive. He had to ensure that the government would continue to exist before he could ensure that it would continue functioning. And Davis dealt with not having a navy to contest the blockade by resorting to opportunistic thinking by way of a covert agent and by raising a sunken warship. Time would tell whether either course of action would yield favorable results, but for the time being, each man had addressed a desperate need. And what about General Scott's search for organizational leadership? As generals left for the South, some of his most qualified commanders among them, he realized the real need for a succession plan. He had an honest assessment of himself and knew success would depend upon having a general in the field who could command the new armies being assembled. For as vain and egotistical the old general had been in the past, he wisely knew he had to pass the baton of leadership to the next generation. He brought his full expertise to bear to finish his military career well without abdicating any of his responsibilities, outlining the grand strategy of the Anaconda Plan, integrating the rapid call-up of volunteers into the Army's organization, and protecting and defending the capital when it was most vulnerable. And finally, let's not forget what we can take away from the search for heroes not only in history but also in the history we're living through. It's a both and proposition when it comes to people with qualities we may admire and seek to imitate, and the total collapse of people when they're unfit for what is actually required of them. If success is never guaranteed, then a humble spirit will remain a worthwhile and valuable attitude for whatever future opportunities may come. In our next episode, Americans in both the North and South will watch. Armies move against one another, in Virginia and in Missouri. And between them in Kentucky, the vast landscape between the Appalachians and the Mississippi would teeter on the brink of secession. The tension of force deployed against force will ratchet the crisis into warfare. How would the armies function under fire? How would their leaders lead and react? And how would the people respond to bloodshed and the loss of loved ones for their cause? Please be sure to like and subscribe to the podcast wherever you listen to it. And please share Breaking Nation with the friends that you know who are into the Civil War. You can also follow our Facebook page and get notices of weekly blog posts on our website. We're keeping you right in the middle of what it was like living in 1861 in November and December with events from those months as featured content. As always, thank you for listening, supporting, and sharing. I truly appreciate it.com. I'm Scott Holmgren, your host. Thank you for listening. And if you're not learning, you're not living.